Abstract. We study generalized simulation relations for alternating Büchi automata (ABA), as well as alternating finite automata. Having multiple pebbles allows the Duplicator to "hedge her bets" and delay decisions in the simulation game, thus yielding a coarser simulation relation. We define (k1, k2)-simulations, with k1/k2 pebbles on the left/right, respectively. This generalizes previous work on ordinary simulation (i.e., (1, 1)-simulation) for nondeterministic Büchi automata (NBA) in [3] and ABA in [4] , and (1, k)-simulation for NBA in [2] . We consider direct, delayed and fair simulations. In each case, the (k1, k2)-simulations induce a complete lattice of simulations where (1, 1)-and (n, n)-simulations are the bottom and top element (if the automaton has n states), respectively, and the order is strict. For any fixed k1, k2, the (k1, k2)-simulation implies (ω-)language inclusion and can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore, quotienting an ABA w.r.t. (1, n)-delayed simulation preserves its language. Finally, multipebble simulations yield new insights into the Miyano-Hayashi construction [10] on ABA.
Introduction
We consider simulation relations on (alternating) finite-and infinite word automata: nondeterministic finite automata (NFA), alternating finite automata (AFA), nondeterministic Büchi automata (NBA) and alternating Büchi automata (ABA). Simulation preorder is a notion of semantic comparison of two states, called left state and right state, in automata, where the larger right state can match all moves of the smaller left one in a stepwise way. Simulation preorder implies language inclusion on NFA/AFA/NBA/ABA [3, 4] , but not vice-versa. While checking language inclusion is PSPACE-complete for all these classes of automata [7, 11] , the simulation relation can be computed in polynomial time [3, 4] .
Checking simulation preorder between two states can be presented as a game with two players, Spoiler and Duplicator, where Spoiler tries to prove that the simulation relation does not hold while Duplicator has the opposite objective. In every round of the simulation game, Spoiler chooses a transition from the current left state and Duplicator must choose a transition from the current right state which has the same action label. Duplicator wins iff the game respects the accepting states in the automata, and different requirements for this yield finer or coarser simulation relations. In direct simulation, whenever the left state is accepting, the right state must be accepting. In delayed simulation, whenever the left state is accepting, the right state must be eventually accepting. In fair simulation, if the left state is accepting infinitely often, then the right state must be accepting infinitely often. For finite-word automata, only direct simulation is meaningful, but for Büchi automata delayed and fair simulation yield coarser relations; see [3] for an overview.
Pathfinder counter-strategy, the resulting computation visits some accepting state in F infinitely often. The language L ω (Q) recognized by Q is defined as the set of words w ∈ Σ ω s.t. Automaton wins G ω (Q, w). See [4] for a formal definition. If we view an ABA Q as an acceptor of finite words, then we obtain an alternating finite automaton (AFA). For w = w 0 . . . w m ∈ Σ * , the finite acceptance game G fin (Q, w) is defined as above for G ω (Q, w), except that the game stops when the last symbol w m of w has been read, and Automaton wins if the last state is in F . L fin (Q) is defined in the obvious way. An alternating transition system (ATS) Q is an AFA where all states are accepting, and Tr(Q) := L fin (Q) is its trace language. When we just say "automaton", it can be an ABA, AFA or ATS, depending on the context. If Q is a set, with 2 Q we denote the set of subsets of Q, and, for any k ∈ N, with 2 Q,k we denote the subset of 2 Q consisting of elements of cardinality at most k. When drawing pictures, we represent existential states by q and universal states by q .
Multipebble simulations. We define multipebble simulations in a game-theoretic way. The game is played by two players, Spoiler and Duplicator, who play in rounds. The objective of Duplicator is to show that simulation holds, while Spoiler has the complementary objective. We use the metaphor of pebbles for describing the game: We call a pebble existential if it is on an existential state, and universal otherwise; Left if it is on the l.h.s. of the simulation relation, and Right otherwise. Intuitively, Spoiler controls existential Left pebbles and universal Right pebbles, while Duplicator controls universal Left pebbles and existential Right pebbles. The presence of > 1 pebbles in each side is due to the further ability of Duplicator to split pebbles to several successors. Moreover, Duplicator always has the possibility of "taking pebbles away". Since not all available pebbles have to be on the automaton, k + 1 pebbles are at least as good as k.
Formally, let Q be an alternating automaton, q 0 ∈ 2 Q,k1 a k 1 -set and s 0 ∈ 2 Q,k2 a k 2 -set. We define the basic (k 1 , k 2 )-simulation game G (k1,k2) (q 0 , s 0 ) as follows. Let Γ Sp and Γ Dup be a set of actions (or transitions) for the two players (to be specified below). In the initial configuration q 0 , s 0 , Left pebbles are on q 0 and Right pebbles on s 0 . If the current configuration at round i is q i , s i , then the next configuration q i+1 , s i+1 is determined as follows:
We now define the two transition relations. Let q E := q ∩ E be the set of existential states in q, and define q U , s E , s U similarly. Let P 1 := 2 Q,k1 × 2 Q,k2 and P 0 := Σ × 2 Q,k1 × 2 Q,k2 . Γ Sp ⊆ P 1 × P 0 models Spoiler's moves: (q, s, a, q ′ , s ′ ) ∈ Γ Sp iff Spoiler chooses a as the next input symbol, and -q ′ is obtained from q E by choosing a successor for each pebble in q E . Formally, q ′ = { select(∆(q, a)) | q ∈ q E }, where select(r) chooses an element in r. -Similarly, s ′ is obtained from s U by choosing a successor for each pebble in s U .
Duplicator's moves are of the form (q, s, a, q ′ , s ′ , q ′′ , s ′′ ) ∈ Γ Dup ⊆ P 1 × P 0 × P 1 :
-q ′′ is a non-empty k 1 -subset of q ′ ∪ ∆(q U , a), and -s ′′ is a non-empty k 2 -subset of s ′ ∪ ∆(s E , a).
Notice that Duplicator is always allowed to "take pebbles away", and to "hedge her bets" by splitting pebbles into different successors. We say that a pebble on state q is stuck if q has no a-successor (where a is clear from the context). We now formally define strategies. A strategy for Spoiler is a function δ : P * 1 P 1 → P 0 compatible with Γ Sp , i.e., for any (π · q, s ) ∈ P * 1 P 1 , δ(π · q, s ) = (a, q ′ , s ′ ) implies (q, s, a, q ′ , s ′ ) ∈ Γ Sp . Similarly, a strategy for Duplicator is a function σ : P * 1 P 1 → (P 0 → P 1 ) compatible with Γ Dup , i.e., for any π ∈ P * 1 P 1 and (a, q ′ , s ′ ) ∈ P 0 , σ(π)(a, q ′ , s ′ ) = q ′′ , s ′′ implies (q, s, a, q ′ , s ′ , q ′′ , s ′′ ) ∈ Γ Dup . A play π = q 0 , s 0 q 1 , s 1 · · · ∈ P * 1 ∪ P ω 1 is a finite or infinite sequence of configurations in P 1 . For a word w = a 0 a 1 · · · ∈ Σ * ∪ Σ ω s.t. |w| = |π| − 1 (with |π| = ω = ω − 1 if π ∈ Σ ω ), we say that a play π is σ-conform to w iff, for any i < |π|, there exists some (q i , s i , a i , q
. Intuitively, σ-conform plays are those plays which originate when Duplicator's strategy is fixed to σ; δ-conform plays, for δ a Spoiler's strategy, are defined similarly. Below, both strategies are fixed, and the resulting, unique play is conform to both.
The game can halt prematurely, for pebbles may get stuck. In this case, the winning condition is as follows: If there exists a Left pebble which cannot be moved, then Duplicator wins. Dually, if no Right pebble can be moved, then Spoiler wins.
Remark 1.
Our winning condition differs from the one in [4] when pebbles get stuck. There, the losing player is always the one who got stuck. If we let Duplicator win when Spoiler is stuck on a universal Right pebble, we would obtain a simulation which does not imply language containment. (Notice that "simulation implies containment" is proved in [4] under the assumption that pebbles do not get stuck.) Furthermore, the condition in [4] is unnecessarily strong when Duplicator is stuck on a universal Left pebble, where letting Spoiler win is too conservative. Our definition generalizes the correct winning condition to multiple pebbles, for which we prove "simulation implies containment" without further assumptions.
In all other cases, we have that all Left pebbles can be moved and at least one Right pebble can be moved, and the two players build an infinite sequence of configurations π = q 0 , s 0 q 1 , s 1 · · · ∈ P The winning condition for delayed and fair simulation requires some technical preparation, which consists in the notion of being existentially/universally good since some previous round. Given the current round m, we say that a state q ∈ q m has seen a stateq since some previous round i ≤ m, written has seen
We are now ready to define the simulation relation ⊑ x (k1,k2) , with x as above. We say that a k 2 -set s x-simulates a k 1 -set q, written q ⊑ x (k1,k2) s, if Duplicator has a winning strategy in G x (k1,k2) (q, s). We overload the simulation relation ⊑ Multipebble simulations hierarchy. In general, having more pebbles (possibly) gives more power to the Duplicator. This is similar to the (1, k)-simulations for NBA studied in [2] , but in our context there are two independent directions of "growing power". Theorem 1. Let x ∈ {o, ∃di, ∀di, de, f} and k
. Proof (Sketch). Point 1) follows directly from the definitions, since Duplicator can always take pebbles away. Point 2) is illustrated in Figure 1 , which holds for any kind of simulation x ∈ {o, ∃di, ∀di, de, f}.
s for any k1 ≤ 2, k2 ≤ 3, with k1 < 2 or k2 < 3. The alphabet is Σ ′ = {a} ∪ Σ, with Σ = {b1, b2, c1, c2, c3}. Note that both automata recognize the same language, both over finite and infinite words:
Theorem 2. For any k 1 , k 2 ∈ N >0 and any automaton Q,
Moreover, for each containment, there exists Q s.t. the containment is strict.
Proof. The containments follow directly from the definitions. For the strictness, consider again the example in Figure 1 , with the modifications below. If no state on the right is accepting, then no simulation holds except ordinary simulation. If q is accepting, then universal direct simulation does not hold, but delayed simulation does. Finally, if the only accepting state is q, then delayed simulation does not hold, but fair simulation does. Is is easy to generalize this example for any k 1 , k 2 ∈ N >0 . ⊓ ⊔ 3 Finite words Lemma 1. For any automaton Q with n states and states q, s ∈ Q:
In particular, the last two points above show that existential-direct (resp., ordinary) simulation "reaches" language inclusion (resp., trace inclusion) at (n, n).
Subset constructions.
The subset construction is a well-known procedure for determinizing NFAs [7] . It is not difficult to generalize it over alternating automata, where it can be used for eliminating existential states, i.e., to perform the de-existentialization of the automaton. The idea is the same as in the subset construction, except that, when considering a-successors of a macrostate (for a symbol a ∈ Σ), existential and universal states are treated differently. For existential states, we apply the same procedure as in the classic subset construction, by taking always all a-successors. For universal states, each a-successor induces a different transition in the subset automaton. This ensures that macrostates can be interpreted purely disjunctively, and the language of a macrostate equals the union over the language of the states belonging to it. Accordingly, a macrostate is accepting if it contains some state which is accepting.
The previous construction can be dualized for de-universalizing finite automata. For an AFA Q, let S ∃ (Q) and S ∀ (Q) be its de-existentialization and de-universalization, respectively. (See Definitions 1 and 2 in Appendix B.1.)
The following lemma formalizes the intuition that multipebble simulations for AFA in fact correspond to (1, 1)-simulations over the appropriate subset-constructions.
Lemma 2. Let Q 1 , Q 2 be two AFAs over the same alphabet Σ, with |Q 1 | = n 1 and |Q 2 | = n 2 . Then, for any k 1 ≤ n 1 and k 2 ≤ n 2 ,
Infinite words
Multipebble existential-direct simulation is not suitable for being used for ω-automata, since it does not even imply ω-language inclusion.
Theorem 3.
For any k 1 , k 2 ∈ N >0 , not both equal to 1, there exist an automaton Q and states q, s Proof. Consider the example in Figure 2 (a). Clearly, q ⊑ ∃di (1,2) s holds, since Duplicator can split pebbles on the successors of s, and one such pebble is accepting, as required
This motivates the definition of universal-direct simulation, which does imply ω-language inclusion, like the coarser delayed and fair simulations.
Unlike in the finite word case, ω-language inclusion is not "reached" by the simulations {∀di, de, f}. See Figure 2 (b) and Appendix C.
Theorem 5.
For any x ∈ {∀di, de, f}, there exist an automaton Q and states
The Miyano-Hayashi construction The Miyano-Hayashi (MH) construction [10] is a subset-like construction for ABAs which removes universal non-determinism, i.e., it performs the de-universalization of ω-automata. The idea is similar to the analogous construction over finite words, with extra bookkeeping needed for recording visits to accepting states, which may occur not simultaneously for different runs. A set of obligations is maintained, encoding the requirement that, independently of how universal non-determinism is resolved, an accepting state has to be eventually reached. There is a tight relationship between these obligations and fair multipebble simulation. For an ABA Q, let Q nd be the de-universalized automaton obtained by applying the MHconstruction. (See also Definition 3 in Appendix C.1.)
The following lemma says that the MH-construction produces an automaton which is (n, 1)-fair-simulation equivalent to the original one, and this result is "tight" in the sense that it does not hold for either direct, or delayed simulation. 
Since fair simulation implies language inclusion, Q and Q nd have the same language. This constitutes an alternative proof of correctness for the MH-construction.
The MH-construction "preserves" fair simulation in the following sense.
Remark 3. A weaker version of the "only if" direction of Lemma 4 above, namely
(1,1) S nd (notice the (1, 1) in the premise), had already appeared in [4] . The same statement for both direct and delayed simulation is false, unlike as incorrectly claimed in [4] . In fact, it can be shown (with an example similar to Figure 3 ) that there exist automata Q and S s.t. Q ⊑ x (1,1) S, but Q nd ⊑ x (1,1) S nd , with x ∈ {di, de}. Finally, the "if" direction of Lemma 4 can only be established in the context of multiple pebbles, and it is new.
Transitivity. While most (k 1 , k 2 )-simulations are not transitive, some limit cases are. By defining a notion of join for (1, n)-and (n, 1)-strategies (see Appendix C.2), we establish that (1, n) and (n, 1) simulations are transitive. Remark 4 (Difficulties for (n, n) transitivity.). We did consider transitivity for (n, n)-simulations on ABA, but found two major issues there. The first issue concerns directly the definition of the join of two (n, n)-strategies, and this holds for any x ∈ {∀di, de, f}: The so-called "puppeteering technique", currently used for defining the join for (1, n)-and (n, 1)-strategies, requires to maintain several games, and to pipe the output from one game to the input of one or more other games. This creates a notion of dependency between different games. For (1, n) and (n, 1), there are no cyclic dependencies, and we were able to define the joint strategy. However, for (n, n)-simulations, there are cyclic dependencies, and it is not clear how the joint strategy should be defined.
The second issue arises from the fact that we further require that the join of two winning strategies is itself a winning strategy. Therefore, the joint strategy needs to carry an invariant which implies the x-winning condition, for x ∈ {∀di, de, f}. While such an invariant for x = ∀di is straightforward, it is not clear what the correct invariant should be for either delayed or fair simulation.
Quotienting
In the following we discuss how multipebble simulation preorders can be used for statespace reduction of alternating automata, i.e., we discuss under which notions of quotient the quotient automaton recognizes the same language as the original one.
Let Q = (Q, Σ, q I , ∆, E, U, F ) be an alternating automaton, over finite or infinite words. Let be any binary relation on Q, and let ≈ be the induced equivalence, defined as ≈= * ∩(
is the function that maps each element q ∈ Q to the equivalence class
We overload [P ] on sets P ⊆ Q by taking the set of equivalence classes.
In all the notions of quotients that will be defined, only the transition relation varies. Thus, we gather the common part under a quotient skeleton. We define the quotient skeleton
. We leave ∆ ≈ unspecified at this time, as it will have different concrete instantiations later. Notice that mixed classes, i.e., classes containing both existential and universal states, are declared existential.
The following definitions are borrowed from [4] . We say that q ′ ∈ ∆(q, a) is a kx-minimal a-successor of q iff there there is no strictly ⊑
a (q) be the set of minimal/maximal successors.
Finite words
Let be any preorder which implies language inclusion over finite words, i.e., q s =⇒ L fin (q) ⊆ L fin (s). In particular, one can take = (⊑ ∃di (k1,k2) ) * , or even equal to language inclusion itself. As before, let ≈ be the equivalence induced by . It is well known that automata over finite words can be quotiented w.r.t. any preorder which implies language equivalence. Here, we show that not all transitions are needed, and that is is sufficient to consider -maximal successors of existential states and -minimal successors of universal states. We define the minimax [4] quotient automaton Q m ≈ by instantiating the quotient skeleton (see Section 5) with transition relation
Notice that transitions from universal states in mixed classes are ignored altogether.
Lemma 5. Let Q be any alternating finite automaton, and let be any preorder which implies finite-language inclusion. Then, for any q ∈ Q,
Infinite words
Unlike for finite words, it is well known that quotienting ω-automata w.r.t. ω-languageequivalence does not preserve the ω-language. It has even been shown that quotienting w.r.t.
(1, 1)-fair (bi)simulation does not preserve the ω-language either [6, 3] . Therefore, one has to look for finer simulations, like delayed or direct simulation. Notice that multipebble existential-direct simulation cannot be used for quotienting, since it does not even imply ω-language inclusion-see Theorem 3. Minimax quotients for universal-direct simulation. In [4] it has been shown that minimax quotients preserve the ω-language (for direct simulation), and that one can consider just maximal/minimal successors of existential/universal states, respectively. Here, we improve this notion, by showing that, when considering multiple-pebbles, it is not needed to consider every maximal successor of existential states, but it is safe to discard those maximal successors which are (1, k)-simulated by a k-set of other maximal successors. This suggests the following definition: For q ∈ E, a ∈ Σ and k > 0, we say that q ′ is a set of k-maximal representatives for a-successors of q iff
Notice that the above definition is non-deterministic, in the sense that there might be different sets of maximal representatives: In this case, one can just take any ⊆-minimal set satisfying Equation 4 . In the following, we assume that a set of maximal representatives q ′ has been selected for any q ∈ E and a ∈ Σ. We define the minimax+ quotient automaton Q m+ ≈ by instantiating the quotient skeleton (see Section 5) with transition relation ∆ ≈ := ∆ m+ ≈ , which differs from ∆ m ≈ just for existential and mixed classes:
where q ′ is a fixed set of k-maximal representatives for a-successors of q, as defined above.
Our definition of minimax+ quotient differs from the one in [4] also w.r.t. the treatment of mixed classes, as discussed in the following remarks.
Remark 5. While in [4] universal states in mixed classes do induce transitions (to minimal elements), in our definition we ignore these transitions altogether. In the setting of (1, 1)-simulations these two definitions coincide, as they are shown in [4] to yield exactly the same transitions, but this needs not be the case in our setting: In the context of multiple-pebbles, one minimal transition from an universal state q U might be subsumed by no single transition from some existential state q E in the same class, but it is always the case that q E has a set of transitions which together subsume the one from q U (cf. Lemma 15 in Appendix D.3). In this case, we show that one can in fact always discard the transitions from q U . Thus, in the context of multiple-pebbles, minimax+ quotients result in less transitions than just minimax quotients from [4] .
Remark 6. While minimax mixed classes are deterministic when considering (1, 1)-simulations [4] , this is not necessarily true when multiple pebbles are used. 
Semielective quotients for delayed simulation. It has been shown in [4] [4] , which are like minimax quotients, with the only difference that every transition induced by existential states is considered, not just maximal ones. Except for that, all previous remarks still apply. In particular, in mixed classes in semielective quotients it is necessary to ignore non-minimal transitions from universal states-the quotient automaton would recognize a bigger language otherwise. While for the (1, 1)-simulations on ABA in [4] it is actually possible to ignore transitions from universal states in mixed classes altogether (see Remark 5) , in the context of multiple-pebbles this is actually incorrect, as shown in Figure 5 , Appendix D.3. The reason is similar as why non-maximal transitions from existential states cannot be discarded: This might prevent accepting states from being visited. We define the semielelective+ quotient automaton Q se+ ≈ by instantiating the quotient skeleton (see Section 5) with ∆ ≈ := ∆ se+ ≈ , where
⇐⇒ (q, a, q ′ ) ∈ ∆ and either q ∈ E, or q ∈ U and q ′ ∈ min n,de a (q)
Remark 7. It is surprising that, unlike for NBA [2] , quotienting ABA w.r.t.
(1, k)-de simulations, for 1 < k < n, does not preserve the language of the automaton in general.
The problem is again in the mixed classes, where minimal transitions from universal states can be selected only by looking at the full (1, n)-simulation. See the counterexample in Figure 4 , where the dashed transition is present in the (1, k)-quotient, despite being non-(1, n)-minimal.
Remark 8.
Semielective multipebble quotients can achieve arbitrarily high compression ratios relative to semielective 1-pebble quotients, (multipebble-)direct minimax quotients and mediated preorder quotients [1] (see Figure 6 in Appendix D.3). (1, k)-semielective+ quotients on ABA do not preserve the ω-language for 1 < k < n in general. Let k = 2. The only two (1, k)/(1, n)-equivalent states are qu and qe, and in the quotient they form a mixed class. q1 is not a (1, n)-minimal a-successor of qu, but it is a (1, k)-minimal successor for k = 2. Thus, the only difference between the (1, n)-and (1, k)-semielective+ quotients is that the dashed transition is (correctly) not included in the former, but (incorrectly) included in the latter. Thus the (1, k)-semielective+ quotient automaton would incorrectly accept the word w = aaea ω ∈ L ω (qI ) = aaa{b + c + d}a ω .
Solving Multipebble Simulation Games
In this section we show how to solve the multipebble simulation games previously defined. We encode each simulation game into a 2-player game-graph with an ω-regular winning condition. In the game-graph, Eve will take the rôle of Duplicator, and Adam the one of Spoiler. A game-graph is a tuple G = V E , V A , → , where nodes in V E belong to Eve (mimicking Duplicator), and nodes in V A belong to Adam (mimicking Spoiler). Transitions are represented by elements in
, where we write p → q for (p, q) ∈→. Notice that the two players strictly alternate while playing, i.e., the game graph is bipartite. We write V for V E ∪ V A . We introduce the following monotone operator on 2
is the set of nodes where Eve can force the game into x.
We define various game-graphs for solving simulations. We express the winning region of Eve as a µ-calculus fixpoint expression over V A [8] , which can then be evaluated using standard fixpoint algorithms. We derive the desired complexity upper bounds using the following fact: Lemma 6. Let e be a fixpoint expression over a graph V , with |V | ∈ n O(k) . Then, for any fixed k ∈ N, evaluating e can be done in time polynomial in n.
For solving direct and fair simulation, we refer the reader to Appendix E. Here, we consider just delayed simulation, which is the most difficult (and interesting).
The natural starting point for defining G de is the definition in [2] of the game-graph for computing (1, k)-simulations for NBAs. Unfortunately, the game-graph in [2] is actually incorrect: According to the definition of delayed simulation (cf. Section 2), every new obligation encountered when the left side is accepting at some round should be independently satisfied by the right side, which has to be good since that round. Now, the algorithm in [2] just tries to satisfy the most recent obligation, which overrides all the previous ones. This is an issue: If the left side is continuously accepting, for example, then the right side might simply have not enough time to satisfy any obligation at all. Therefore, [2] actually computes an under-approximation to delayed simulation.
We overcome this difficulty by explictly bookkeeping all pending constraints. This leads to the following definitions. The game-graph for delayed simulation is
de , where nodes in V de A are of the form v (q,Bad,s,Good) , and nodes in
and Good = g 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ g m2 are two sequences of sets of states from Q, strictly ordered by set-inclusion, which are used to keep track of multiple obligations.
Intuitively, Bad is used to detect when new constraints should be created, i.e., to detect when every Left pebble is universally good since some previous round. At each round, a new set of bad pebbles b = q \ F is added to Bad. When accepting states are visited by Left pebbles, they are discarded from every set b ∈ Bad. When some b becomes eventually empty, this means that, at the current round, all Left pebbles are universally good since some previous round: At this point, b is removed from Bad, and we say that the red light flashes.
The sequence Good represents a set of constraints to be eventually satisfied. Each g ∈ Good is a set of good pebbles, which we require to "grow" until it becomes equal to s. When Good = ∅, there is no pending constraint. Constraints are added to Good when the red light flashes (see above): In this case, we update Good by adding the new empty constraint g = ∅. When accepting states are visited by Right pebbles, we upgrade every constraint g ∈ Good by adding accepting states. Completed constraints g = s are then removed from Good, and we say that the green light flashes.
We have that Eve wins iff every red flash is matched by at least one green flash, and different red flashes are matched by different green ones. This can be checked by verifying that infinitely often either Good = ∅ or s ∈ Good, i.e., it is not the case that Good contains a constraint that it is not eventually "completed" and discarded. Let T = {v (q,Bad,s,Good) | Good = ∅ ∨ s ∈ Good}, and define the initial configuration as
Theorem 10. For any fixed k 1 , k 2 ∈ N, x ∈ {∀di, ∃di, de, f} and sets q, s ⊆ Q, deciding whether q ⊑ x (k1,k2) s can be done in polynomial time.
Conclusions and Future Work
Transitivity for (n, n)-simulations. As discussed at the end of Section 4, composing (n, n) (winning) strategies is apparently much more difficult than in the (1, n) and (n, 1) case. We conjecture that all types of (n, n)-simulations discussed in this paper are transitive, and showing this would conceivably solve the join problem as well.
Quotienting with (n, 1)-and (n, n)-simulations. While we have dealt with (1, n)-quotients, we have not considered (n, 1)-or (n, n)-quotients. For the latter, one should first solve the associated transitivity problem, and, for both, an appropriate notion of semielective-quotient has to be provided. We have shown that this is already a nontrivial task for (1, n)-simulations on ABA.
Future directions. Our work on delayed simulation has shown that several generalizations are possible. In particular, two issues need to be addressed. The first is the complexity of the structure of the game-graph needed for computing delayed simulation. A possible generalization of delayed simulation involving looser "synchronization requirements" between obligations and their satisfaction might result in simpler gamegraphs. The second issue concerns Lemmas 3 and 4: We would like to find a weaker delayed-like simulation for which the counterexample shown there does not hold. This would give a better understanding of the MH-construction. As in [3] , it is still open to find a hierarchy of (k 1 , k 2 )-multipebble simulations converging to ω-language inclusion when k 1 = k 2 = n.
A Preliminaries (Section 2) Theorem 1. Let x ∈ {o, ∃di, ∀di, de, f} and k
. Proof. 1. This follows directly from the definitions, since having more pebbles can only help Duplicator, who is always allowed to take pebbles away. 2. For showing the strictness of the inclusion, consider the example in Figure 1 , for any kind of simulation x ∈ {o, ∃di, ∀di, de, f}. This example shows that Duplicator wins by "hedging her bets" on both sides, using 2 pebbles on the left and 3 pebbles on the right. Hence, q ⊑ Figure 1 to more pebbles (k 1 , k 2 ). Moreover, a similar example can be crafted without using the stuckness condition, but using only the acceptance condition.
⊓ ⊔ Twe following two observations will be useful in later proofs: When pebbles are good infinitely often, then it is the case that they are always good, as stated below.
The following is a consequence of König's Lemma: Proof. We make use of König's Lemma: We build an infinite tree which is finitely branching, hence by König's Lemma there exists an infinite path π acc starting from the root, and we show that this path contains infinitely many accepting states. First, we extract a subsequence {s ′ j } j≥0 from {s i } i≥0 , as follows: s ′ j := s ij , where i 0 = 0 and, inductively, i j is the least index i > i j−1 s.t. good ∃ (s i , i j−1 ). It follows that, for any
there is a node v(r, j) at level j ≥ 0 in the tree. (For example, the root of the tree is v(s, 0), where s is the only state in s ′ 0 = s 0 = {s}.) The parenthood relation between nodes is defined as follows: We have that, for any r ∈ s ′ j+1 , there exists r ′ ∈ s ′ j s.t. there exists a path from r ′ to r which visits at least one accepting state. In this case, v(r, j + 1) is a children of v(r ′ , j). This tree is infinite and finitely branching. Moreover, the infinite path π acc , whose existence is guaranteed by König's Lemma, visits accepting states infinitely often.
⊓ ⊔ B Section 3 Lemma 1. For any automaton Q with n states, and states q, s ∈ Q:
Proof. Point 2) follows from Point 1), and Point 4) follows from Point 3), since when the set of accepting state is the full set of states, i.e., F = Q, ordinary and direct simulation coincide, and the trace language equals the finite language in this case.
For Points 1) and 3), we defer their proof at the end of the next section. ⊓ ⊔
B.1 Subset constructions
Below, we give a formal definition for the de-existentialization and de-universalization procedures for AFAs.
Definition 1.
Given an AFA Q = (Q, Σ, q I , ∆, F, E, U ) with |Q| = n, the existential n-subset construction yields a purely universal finite automata
where
Intuitively, the choice function select resolves the universal choice, and then we take the union over all possible resolutions of the existential choice.
Definition 2.
Given an AFA Q = (Q, Σ, q I , ∆, F, E, U ) with |Q| = n, the universal n-subset construction yields a purely existential finite automata
= ∅, and (P, a, R) ∈ ∆ ′ iff there exists a choice function select : P ∩E ×Σ → Q which fixes an element in ∆(p, a) for any existential state p ∈ P ∩ E, and
Lemma 2. Let Q 1 , Q 2 be two AFAs over the same alphabet Σ, with |Q 1 | = n 1 and
Proof. First notice that Equation (S3) follows by subsequent application of (S1) and (S2). For Equation (S1), the idea is that maximally splitting pebbles on existential states in Q 2 is exactly the same as moving the only pebble in S ∃ (Q 2 ). More formally, one can show how to mantain the following invariant: q 1 , q 2 is the current configuration in the (k 1 , n 2 )-game on the left iff q 1 , {q 2 } is the current configuration in the (k 1 , 1)-game on the right. From the invariant, the winning condition is easily verified: If q 1 ⊆ F , then q 2 ∩ F = ∅, which is the same as saying q 2 ∈ F ′ , where F ′ is the set of accepting states in S ∃ (Q 2 ). Equation (S2) is proved similarly. ⊓ ⊔
Proof (of Lemma 1).
We first prove Point 1), i.e., q ⊑ ∃di
Let Q 1 and Q 2 be two disjoint copies of Q, where the initial states are, respectively, q and s.
). Finally, since the subset constructions are language-preserving (this follows from their correctness),
is a purely existential automaton and S ∃ (Q 2 ) is a purely universal automaton, hence only Spoiler plays. Thus,
, and, by Equation (S3),
Proof. It suffices to prove the claim for
Similarly, by the containment between universal-direct, delayed and fair simulation established in Theorem 2, it is sufficient to consider just fair simulation, which is the coarsest. Let
be the simulation game between q and s, let G acc 0 = G ω (q, w) be the acceptance game for w from state q, and let G acc 1 = G ω (s, w) be the acceptance game for w from state s. In order to show w ∈ L ω (s), we use the winning strategy of Duplicator in G sim and the information in G acc 0 to witness the existence of a winning strategy for Automaton in G acc 1 . We use the so-called "puppeteering technique" to coordinate the various games. There are two "real players", the Automaton (A 1 ) and Pathfinder (P 1 ) players in G The orchestration job of A 1 is complicated by the fact that in the simulation game G sim multiple Left and Right pebbles may be present in any given round. Henceforth, A 1 mantains a family of acceptance games, depending on the current configuration of the simulation game. The flow of information between the various acceptance games and the simulation game is shown below.
The meaning of the picture is the following. Recall that in G sim , Duplicator is allowed to "hedge her bets", i.e., to split pebbles,
The correctness is guaranteed by the fact that, since A 0 is playing a winning strategy in every G acc 0 game, then regardless of universal choices in G acc 0 , the resulting run will visit accepting states infinitely often. Thus, by construction, Left pebbles in G sim are universally good infinitely often, and, since D is playing a winning strategy for fair simulation, Right pebbles are existentially good infinitely often. We won't explicitly define A 1 's winning strategy for accepting w in G acc 1 , but, using Lemma 9 (which relies on König's Lemma) we will show that one such strategy does exist: Indeed, since Right pebbles are existentially good infinitely often, by Lemma 9, there exists an accepting run for w in G acc 1 , which witnesses the existence of a winning strategy for A 1 . For bookkeeping the state of the various simulation games, we use a logbook. Assume that, at round i, the current partial play in G sim is
with q 0 = {q} and s 0 = {s}, and that the remaining input word to be read is 
(with r, w i we mean that in the language acceptance game the current state is r and the remaining input word is w i ). We say that L i is valid if it further satisfies the following logbook properties:
i.e., (LP0) and (LP1) say that the logbook is correctly "synchronized" with the simulation game, and (LP2) says that every π 0 i,j is built applying A 0 's winning strategy. Inductively
Assume that L i is a valid logbook for round i, that the current configuration of the simlulation game is q i , s i , and that these two sets are partitioned into existential and universal states, in the following way: accept w i (in fact, all states in q i ). In this way, an a i -successor q i+1 need not be existential, we use the superscript (E) just to record that prececessors were existential.) 2. Similarly, the P 1 puppet chooses a successor for every universal G
U } be the set of such a isuccessors, if any. Notice that, at this point, one or even all such configurations may get stuck, i.e., with no a i -successor, and, consequently, q (U) i+1 might be empty. We need not worry about this now. 3. Then, the S puppet in the simulation game G sim copies the A 0 's and P 1 's moves above, moving from q i+1 (possibly being split or thrown away), and the simulation game goes into state (q i+1 , s i+1 ), where
Since D's strategy is winning, at least one Right pebble can be moved to some successor. Thus, s i+1 = ∅. D's move above is copied by the puppte P 0 and the player A 1 , as specified below.
The
Below we argue about the correctness of this construction. Let π = q 0 , s 0 q 1 , s 1 . . . be the resulting infinite play, and let π 0 = q 0 q 1 . . . and π 1 = s 0 s 1 . . . be its projections. Since every partial play in L 0 i is A 0 -conform (by (LP2)), and the A 0 puppet is playing according to a winning strategy (which exists, since w ∈ L ω (q)), it follows that, for every n ≥ 0, there exists i ≥ 0 s.t. every π 0 i,j ∈ L 0 i has visited at least n accepting states. By (LP0) and since no Left pebble is thrown away, we have that good ∀ (π 0 , ∞). Since D's strategy is winning, by the winning condition of fair simulation, we have good ∃ (π 1 , ∞). By Lemma 9, there exists an infinite accepting path π acc . Thus, A 1 has a strategy s.t., for any P 1 's strategy, there exists a accepting path π acc which is conform to both strategies. Thus, w ∈ L ω (s). ⊓ ⊔
Theorem 5.
Proof. By the inclusion between simulations (see Theorem 2), it is enough to consider fair simulation. Take the example in Figure 2 
ω , hence language inclusion holds between q 0 and s 0 , but, as we shall see, no Duplicator strategy is winning in the (n, n)-simulation game G f (n,n) (q 0 , s 0 ). This can be seen as follows. Spoiler chooses the a action and we can assume that Duplicator "hedges her bets" by going in s ′ = {s 0 , s 1 }. Now, Spoiler keeps looping on q 0 by choosing the a action for an arbitrarily high number of moves. Duplicator can only reply by staying in a subset of s ′ . Notice that Duplicator has to eventually take the pebble on s 0 away: Indeed, Spoiler's pebble in q 0 is accepting infinitely often, hence Duplicator would lose if the pebble on s 0 ∈ F is not taken away. When Duplicator takes the pebble on s 0 away, Spoiler plays the b action and Duplicator loses, his remaining pebble on s 1 being stuck. Similar examples may be conceived in which the acceptance condition, instead of the stuckness condition, is used to show that Duplicator loses. ⊓ ⊔
C.1 Infinite words: ABAs and the Miyano-Hayashi construction Definition 3.
Given an ABA Q = (Q, Σ, q I , ∆, F, E, U ), the Miyano-Hayashi construction [10] yields a de-universalized NBA
where the new set of states Q ′ ⊆ 2 Q × 2 Q (called macrostates) consists of pairs of subsets of Q, the set of accepting macrostates F ′ satisfies Proof. We first prove Point a), i.e., Q ⊑ f (n,1) Q nd . Intuitively, the strategy of Duplicator is to maximally hedge her bets on Q (i.e., Left universal pebbles), and to select successors in Q nd (which is a purely existential automaton) by copying Spoiler's moves from Left existential pebbles in Q. More formally, there exists a strategy for Duplicator which mantains the following invariant: If at round k the current configuration is
i.e., a macrostate is accepting if no obligation is pending, E
′ = Q ′ and U ′ = ∅, i.
e., Q nd is a purely non-deterministic automaton, and the the transition relation
, Duplicator has a strategy that mimicks exactly the MH-construction.
We now argue that this strategy is winning for Duplicator. If some Left pebble gets stuck, then Duplicator wins. Otherwise, by the properties of the MH-construction, it is the case that the Right pebble can always be moved; in this case, we argue as follows. Let π = q 0 , (q 0 , o 0 ) q 1 , (q 1 , o 1 ) . . . be the resulting sequence of configurations.
′ . For x = f , assume that there are infinitely many i's s.t. q i is universally good since some previous round j i . Now consider the sequence of indices {k i } i≥0 defined as follows: k 0 = 0, and, inductively, k i+1 is s.t. q ki+1 is good since round k i . (Notice that this sequence is well-defined and infinite: Since there are infinitely many i's s.t. q i is universally good since some previous round j i , by Lemma 8, this implies that for any i, there exists j i ≥ i s.t. q ji is universally good since round i.) We have that, by the definition of the MH-construction, o ki = ∅ for any i > 0. Hence, (q ki , ∅) ∈ F ′ for infinitely many k i 's. We now prove Point b), i.e., Q nd ⊑ f (1,1) Q. We can assume that the Left pebble never gets stuck, otherwise Duplicator wins trivially. Here, the strategy for Duplicator is to maintain the following invariant: If at round k the current configuration is (q k , o k ), q k , then q k ∈ q k , i.e., Duplicator can force the Right pebble to be somewhere in q k . Clearly, the invariant holds for the initial configuration: For i = 0, (q 0 , o 0 ) = ({q I }, {q I }\F ) and q 0 = q I . Inductively, assume that the invariant q k ∈ q k holds for k ≥ 0. We show how Dupicator can ensure it in the next round k + 1. Assume that Spoiler moves the Left pebble to (q k+1 , o k+1 ) and that the next input symbol is a k . We have two cases to consider:
-If q k ∈ E, then, by the MH-construction, there exists q ′ ∈ q k+1 s.t. q ′ ∈ ∆(q k , a k ). In this case, Duplicator moves the Right pebble from q k to q k+1 := q ′ . -If q k ∈ U , then, by the MH-construction, it is the case that ∆(q k , a k ) ⊆ q k+1 .
Hence, Spoiler moves the Right universal pebble q k to any successor q k+1 ∈ ∆(q k , a k ). For every Spoiler's move, q k+1 ∈ q k+1 .
We now argue that this invariant-preserving strategy is winning for Duplicator. Assume that, for infinitely many i's, (q i , o i ) is accepting, i.e., o i = ∅. Hence, we can build an infinite sequence {i j } j≥0 of indices s.t. o ij = ∅ for any j > 0. From the structure of the MH-construction, it follows that for any j > 0, there exists k s.t. i j−1 < k ≤ i j and q k ∈ F . Hence, q k is accepting for infinitely many indices k's.
Points a') and b') are actually shown in Figure 3 , where we give two automata Q but at round k = 3, the Left pebbles on {q 31 , q 32 } are universally good since round 2 (since q 22 and q 31 are in F ), but the Right pebble is never accepting for k ≥ 3. For Point b'), the reasoning is similar, but now q ′ 31 ∈ F . We have that Spoiler can force the game G
2 ) in the following sequence of configurations:
and 2) for no later round k ′ ≥ 2, the Right pebble is accepting (in fact, it is trapped in q ′ 31 ∈ F ), hence Q Proof. We make use of transitivity, which will established later. "Only if". Assume Q ⊑ f (n,1) S. Then, by a double application of Lemma 3,
and, since (1, 1)-simulation is contained in (n, 1)-simulation (see Theorem 1), by transitivity, we obtain Q nd ⊑ f (n,1) S nd . But Q nd is a purely existential automaton, hence (n, 1)-simulation reduces to (1, 1)-simulation in this case. Thus, 
Proof. Directly from Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 below.
⊓ ⊔ (1, n) simulations. Let G 0 = G (1,n) (q, r) and
Definition of the join of two strategies for
(1,n) (r, s) be the basic simulation games between q and r, and between r and s, respectively. Let σ 0 and σ 1 be two Duplicator's strategies in G 0 and G 1 , respectively. We construct a joint strategy σ 0 ⊲⊳ σ 1 for Duplicator in the basic simulation game G = G (1,n) (q, s). In the definition of the join, we assume that the automaton is complete, hence it is always possible to select successors and the simulation game never halts.
We keep track of the current state of the G 0 game and at most n games in G 1 . In the picture above, G 0 is shown in the center, where games in G 1 are shown at the top/bottom of the picture, where, for X ∈ {E, U }, with G Assume that at round k ≥ 0 the current partial play in G is π k , where
We say that a logbook L k is valid if it satisfies the logbook properties below.
Notice that (P1) entails the following property: (P1') For every r ∈ r 
, w k+1 ) for the next round, and we prove it valid. Assume that Spoiler moves as follows:
i.e., the next input symbol is a k and Spoiler moves universal-r.h.s. pebbles from s k to (s k ) ′ . Notice that, if q k is existential, then Spoiler moves the only l.h.s. pebble from
Notice that we can already update the next input word to w k+1 := w k · a k , which defines the third component of the next logbook. 
i.e., a k is fixed by move (S) above, and (s 1 k,i ) ′ is the subset of (s k ) ′ obtained by restricting Spoiler's move (S) to s 1 k,i ⊆ s k , the containment following by property (P2). We now apply G 1 -Duplicator's strategy σ 1 , obtaining
By the completeness condition, it is always possible to select some successor (r . We now consider these moves as adversarial in G 0 , i.e., they induce a G 0 -Spoiler's move ({q
where (r 0 k ) ′ is the set of elements (r U k,i ) ′ above. We then apply G 0 -Duplicator's strategy σ 0 , obtaining 
We then apply G 1 -Duplicator's winning strategy σ 1 :
Once again, the completeness condition entails that it is always possible to select some successor (r
We are now ready to define Finally, we define Duplicator's move in G as
where q k+1 := q 0 k+1 is fixed by move (0-D) if q k = q 0 k is existential, and it is fixed by (S) if it is universal. (Notice that this establishes property (P0).) Moreover, s k+1 is taken to be the union of all sets (s
′′ , which, in turn, establishes property (P2). Hence,
The following theorem shows that ⊑ (1,n) is transitive, i.e., it shows that when σ 0 and σ 1 are both winning, then σ 0 ⊲⊳ σ 1 is winning as well.
Proof. We refer to the logbook L k at round k as defined above. We first deal with the case in which the game G never ends prematurely.
For x = ∀di, we have to show that, whenever q k is accepting, so is every pebble in s k . Assume q k ∈ F . Since σ 0 is a winning strategy, then r 0 k ⊆ F . By the logbook property (P1'), the current configuration of every game in G 1 is of the form r, s , for some r ∈ F and s ⊆ Q. But σ 1 is winning, hence every such s is contained in F . By (P2), s k ⊆ F . For x = de, assume that q k is accepting. Since σ 0 is winning, there exists j ≥ k s.t. good ∃ (r 0 j , k). Thus, for any r 
Then, for all i, every state in s j * ,i has seen an accepting state since round k. By (P2), s j * = i s 1 j * ,i . Thus, every state in s j * has seen an accepting state since round k. Therefore, there exists a minimal k * s.t. k ≤ k * ≤ j * and good ∃ (s k * , k).
For x = f, the reasoning is entirely similar to the previous paragraph. We now deal with the case in which the game G ends prematurely. If the Left pebble on q k is stuck, then Duplicator wins, and we are done. Otherwise, assume that the Left pebble is never stuck. We show that, in this case, the game actually never stops. In fact, since σ 0 is a winning strategy in G 0 , then there always exists some Right pebble r k,i ∈ r k which can proceed. By (P1)', there exists some configuration r k,i , s k,i in G 1 which can go on, and, being σ 1 winning in such a game, then some pebble in s k,i can be moved, and, therefore, some pebble in s k can be moved as well (by (P2)). Thus, G never stops.
⊓ ⊔
Definition of the join of two strategies for (n, 1) simulations. The definitions for (n, 1) simulations are dual to the (1, n) case in the previous section. Let G 0 = G (n,1) (q, r) and G 1 = G (n,1) (r, s) be two basic simulation games. Let σ 0 and σ 1 be two Duplicator's strategies in G 0 and G 1 , respectively. We construct a joint strategy σ 0 ⊲⊳ σ 1 for Duplicator in the basic simulation game G = G (n,1) (q, s) .
We keep track of the current state of the G 1 game and (at most) n games in G 0 using the logbook technique. At round k ≥ 0, the current logbook is a triple
Every logbook L k will satisfy an invariant, which consists of the logbook properties (P0)-(P2) specified below. Assume that at round k ≥ 0 the current play in G is π k , where
We inductively show how to build a valid logbook and how to define the joint strategy σ 0 ⊲⊳ σ 1 . The initial configuration in G 0 is {q}, {r} (there is only one such game initially), the one in G 1 is {r}, {s} , and the one in G is {q}, {s} . Let q 0 = {q}, r 0 = r, r 0 = {r}, and s 0 = s. Hence, the initial logbook
{s 0 } , and w 0 = ε, is clearly valid. Inductively assume that, at round k, the current partial play in G is π k , and that
k and w k are defined as above. By (P2),
, w k+1 ) for the next round. Assume that G-Spoiler moves as follows:
i.e., the next input symbol is a k and Spoiler moves existential-Left pebbles from q k to (q k ) ′ . We take w k+1 = w k · a k . Notice that, if s k is existential, then Spoiler moves the only Right pebble from
, which is guaranteed to exist by property (P1). Spoiler's move (S) above induces the G 0 -Spoiler's move below
which is obtained by restricting to q 0 k,i ⊆ q k the transiton from q k to (q k ) ′ , the inclusion following from (P0). We apply G 0 -Duplicator's strategy σ 0 , obtaining
The move (0-
(in G 0 ). We now consider these moves as adversarial in G 1 , i.e., they induce a
where (r k ) ′ is the set of elements r 0 k+1,i defined above. We then apply G 1 -Duplicator's strategy σ 1 , obtaining
Call a state r ∈ r k useful iff it has not been discarded by move (1-D) , i.e., iff it has some successor in r k+1 . By the logbook property (P1), for each useful universal state r U ∈ r U k , there exists a play π
and we apply G 0 -Duplicator's winning strategy σ 0 , yielding
We now update the first component L . Since every element in r k+1 arises as a successor of some useful element in r k , we have that (P1) holds at round k + 1.
Finally, we define Duplicator's move in G as
where q k+1 is as union over all sets q (1-D) , depending on whether s k was universal or existential, respectively. Notice that, by definition of q k+1 and s k+1 , properties (P0) and (P2) hold for the new logbook. This completes the description of the joint strategy σ 0 ⊲⊳ σ 1 .
The following theorem shows that ⊑ x (n,1) is transitive, i.e., it shows that when σ 0 and σ 1 are both winning, then σ 0 ⊲⊳ σ 1 is winning as well.
Proof. We refer to the logbook L k at round k as defined above. For x = ∀di, we have to show that, whenever some pebble in q k is accepting, so is s k . Assume q k ∩ F = ∅. Then, there exists q F ∈ q k ∩ F and, by (P0), there exists q For x = de, assume that at round k every pebble in q k is universally good since some previous round, i.e., good
be the index for which r 0 k(i * ),i * ∈ F is the last pebble being accepting for the first time since round k, i.e., i * = argmax i (k(i)). Hence, at round k(i * ) ≥ k, every pebble in r k(i * ) has been universally good since round k. Since σ 1 is winning, then there exists
, {s k * } is existentially good since round k. For x = f, assume that q k is universally good since some previous round for infinitely many k's. By reasoning as above for delayed simulation, since σ 0 is winning, then r k is universally good since some previous round for infinitely many k's. Finally, being σ 1 winning, we conclude that s k ∈ F for infinitely many k's. 
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of w ∈ Σ * . Let q any state in Q, and let [q] be its equivalence class. Notice that,
, hence w ∈ L fin (q). Assume w = a 0 . . . a k−1 is a word of length k, and let w ′ = a 1 . . . a k−1 . We proceed by case analysis on the type of [q]. 
, and then one can proceed as above from q E . Thus,
. By the definition of quotient, there exist q
. As (q, a 0 , q ′ ) ∈ ∆ and by the definition of quotient, there exists
, and, by induction hypothesis, w ′ ∈ L fin (q ′ ). But q ′ was arbitrary, thus w ∈ L fin (q). ⊓ ⊔
D.2 Infinite words: Direct simulation
The two directions in Theorem 8 are proved, resp., by Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 below. k) .
, s) and, at round i, if the current configuration of G is 
, and then we apply G( q, s i )-Duplicator's winning strategy, obtaining transition ({ q},
, and the invariant is preserved. We define G-Duplicator's response as 
by fixing successors as prescribed in (*) above. We then apply G(q i , p i )-Duplicator's winning strategy, yielding transition 
We define s i+1 as p i+1 , where elements p ′ are replaced by s ′′ , as specified above. Then, G-Duplicator's response is defined as 
Proof. Since q ⊑ ∀di (1,n) {q} trivially holds, the theorem follows from previous Lemma 12 and 13. ⊓ ⊔
D.3 Infinite words: Delayed simulation
Proof. We actually prove the following richer statement.
Let q ≈ 
Proof. Let s ∈ U , q ∈ E, and q ≈
(1,n) q and by the definition of simulation, there exists q ′ ⊆ ∆(q, a) and
Let s ′ be any element in min
(1,n) s and by the definition of simulation, it follows that, for any q
(1,n) q ′ , and any element in q ′ is simulated by s ′ , we obtain, by transitivity (Theorem 6),
and, by the minimality of s Proof. In the following, we simply write ⊑ instead of ⊑ de (1,n) . Then, when we write q ⊑ σ s, we mean that σ is Duplicator's winning strategy in G(q, s), i.e., the one witnessing q ⊑ s. In the proof, we need the following definitions: For any Duplicator's strategy σ : P P 1 → (P 0 → P 1 ) and for any π ∈ P , we define a new Duplicator's strategy σ π in the following way: For any π
. Given any Duplicator's strategy σ, we say that a sequence π 1 = s k s k+1 . . . is σ-right-conform starting at p k iff there exist sequences π 0 = p k p k+1 . . . and w = a k a k+1 . . . s.t. π = p k , s k p k+1 , s k+1 . . . is σ-conform w.r.t. w. We will use the following fact:
. . is σ-right-conform starting at p k . If p k ∈ F and σ is a winning strategy, then there exists i ≥ k s.t. good ∃ (s i , k).
We are now ready for proving the lemma.
We build a sequence of winning strategies σ 0 , σ 1 , . . . , s.t., at round k, σ k is a winning strategy in G k , i.e., q k ⊑ σ k s k . Then, we define a strategy σ for Duplicator in G, which, at round k, is defined in terms of σ k . Finally, we prove that σ is winning.
Assume the current configuration in G is [q k ], s k , and that σ k is a winning strategy in G k s.t. q k ⊑ σ k s k . Let Spoiler choose the next input symbol a k . We consider two cases, depending on whether [q k ] is existential or universal.
First case:
By the definition of semielective quotient, there exist q
, otherwise let q F be just q. We distinguish two subcases, depending on whether q is in E or in U .
-First subcase: q ∈ E. We have that
F ⊲⊳ σ k , and let s k+1 be the result of G( q, s k )-Duplicator playing according toσ, i.e.,σ({ q}, 
Since q ⊑ q E , by the minimality of q ′ and Point 2) of Lemma 15, there exists q
, s)-Spoiler, and not under the control of
, where q ′ is the a a k -successor fixed by G([q], s)-Spoiler above. As before, q k+1 ⊑ σ ′ q ′ ⊑σπ s k+1 , where π = q, s k . Hence, by transitivity, q k+1 ⊑ σ ′ ⊲⊳σ s k+1 . We let σ k+1 := σ ′ ⊲⊳σ π .
In both cases, q k+1 ⊑ σ k+1 s k+1 . We define G-Duplicator's winning strategy σ as
according toσ. We let σ k+1 :=σ π , with π = {q F }, s k . The crucial point is that we can assume w.l.o.g. that q k+1 is a de-minimal a k -successor of q F . This implies that there exists a a k -transition in the quotient automaton from
This concludes the description of the second case.
We now argue about the correctness of the construction above, showing that Duplicator's strategy is winning in G. If the Left pebble in G gets stuck, then Duplicator wins, and we are done. Otherwise, assume the Left pebble never gets stuck. By construction, since we are taking joins of winning strategies, it follows that some Right pebble can always be moved, and the game does not halt prematurely. Thus, an infinite path 
The lemma below implies q ⊑ 
Proof. We maintain the following invariant: Inductively, assume the current configuration is (s k , [q k ]) and the invariant s k ∈ [q k ] holds. We distinguish three different cases.
and by the definition of semielective quotient, there exists a transition
Clearly s k+1 ∈ [s k+1 ], and the invariant is preserved.
′ . In this case, Spoiler only chooses a k :
If s k has no a k -successor, then Duplicator wins. Otherwise, let s k+1 ∈ min n,de a k (s k ) be a de-minimal a k -successor of s k . By the definition of semielective quotient and by the minimality of s k+1 , there exists a transition
Clearly . An example showing that multipebble-semielective quotients can achieve arbitrarily high compression ratios. The NBA above has k + 4 states, and the pi's are (1, 1)-delayed simulation incomparable: Thus, the (1, 1)-semielective quotient has k + 4 states. However, the pi's are all (1, n)-delayed simulation equivalent (and n = 2 suffices), therefore the (1, n)-semielective quotient has only 4 states. Moreover, the pi's are incomparable also w.r.t. (1, n)-universal direct simulation, which shows that semielective quotients can achieve arbitrarily high compression ratios relative to minimax quotients. Finally, notice that direct backward simulation does not help either: In fact, any two pi, pj, with i = j, are backward-simulation incomparable, as there is just one way of backward reaching the unique initial state p0. (Remember that backward simulations should be compatible with the initial states, at least.) Therefore, quotienting methods which employ backward simulations, like mediated preorder [1] , do not result in a smaller automaton.
E Section 6
We give upper-bounds on the size of game-graphs necessary for computing multipebble simulations. When considering the size of the those game-graphs, we will make use of the following counting function:
which counts the number of subsets of size ≤ k of a given set of size n, and we will approximate its value from above by using the following rough upper bound sub n (k) ≤ (n + 1) k .
Intuitively, the bound above may be seen as follows: Instead of counting sets of size ≤ k, one counts ordered sets; each ordered set can be represented as a k-string over an alphabet of size n + 1, where we use an extra end-of-string symbol. We also give a formal calculation. 
E.1 Solving existential and universal direct simulation
For computing the winner for direct simulation, we construct a 2-player game
di , where Eve has a safety objective. The game-graph is the same for both existential and universal direct simulation, but the safety objective is different. Nodes in V di A take the form v (q,s) , while nodes in V di E take the form v (q,s,a,q ′ ,s ′ ) , with q, q ′ ∈ 2 Q,k1 and s, s ′ ∈ 2 Q,k2 , and a ∈ Σ.
Lemma 18. V di ≤ 2 · (n + 1) 2(k1+k2) · |Σ|.
E model choices of Spoiler: For any (q, s, a, q ′ , s ′ ) ∈ Γ Sp , there is a transition for Adam v (q,s) → v (q,s,a,q ′ ,s ′ ) . Similarly, for any Duplicator's Let T 1 be the set of states of the form v (q,bad,s,good) with bad = ∅, and let T 2 be the set of states of the form v (q,bad,s,good) with good = s. The winning criterion for fair simulation is translated in the following 1-pair Street condition (also known as a reactivity condition [9] ): If T 1 is visited infinitely often, then T 2 is visited infinitely often. Therefore, winning nodes for Eve are those in W f = νx . µy . νz . T 2 ∩ cpre(x) ∪ T 1 ∩ cpre(y) ∪ T 1 ∩ cpre(z) .
E.3 Solving delayed simulation
We recall the definition of the game-graph for computing delayed simuation: 
and Good = g 1 , . . . , g m2 with 0 ≤ m 2 ≤ k 2 , satisfies, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , m 2 },
We also denote with Bad the set {b 1 , . . . , b m1 }, and similarly for Good. Proof. Properties (B1) and (G1) are preserved by how b ′ and g ′ are constructed, on lines 4 and 15, respectively. Similarly, the strictess of the order, i.e., (B2) and (G2), is preserved by removing duplicate elements (lines 6 and 17). Finally, property (B3) follows by the check at line 8, which enforces that empty elements are removed from Bad ′ , if any (line 9). ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 7. V de ≤ 2·(n+1) 2(k1+k2) · 1 + (k 1 + 1) k1+1 · 1 + 2(k 2 + 1) k2+1 ·|Σ|.
Proof. We first count the number of pairs (s, Good). Assume |g m2 | = h ≤ k 2 (notice that m 2 ≤ h). We consider two cases, depending on whether g 1 = ∅ or not. First case: g 1 = ∅. Then, we can represent the strictly increasing sequence g 1 ⊂ g 2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ g m2 by the sequence {d i } 1≤i≤m2 of non-empty differences, defined as d 1 = g 1 and I.e., we sum over all sizes i for sets s, and either Good is empty, or Good is nonempty. In this second case, we sum over all possibilities for the size h ∈ {1, . . . , i} of the largest g m2 (by (G1), every g ∈ Good is ⊆ s), and over all possibilities for the number of elements m 2 in Good: For each such combination of indices, we have seq h (m 2 ) + seq h (m 2 − 1) sequences. We now proceed to derive a bound on f 2 (n, k 2 ).
As seq h (m 2 ) represents the number of surjective functions from a set of size h to a set of size m 2 , clearly seq h (m 2 ) ≤ m h 2 , just considering all such functions. Then,
We now count the number of pairs (q, Bad). Assume |b 1 | = h ≤ k 1 (notice that m 1 ≤ h). By an argument similar to the one in the previous paragraph, we have that the number of non-empty sequences b 1 ⊃ b 2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ b m1 = ∅ is seq h (m 1 ). Hence, the number of pairs (q, Bad) is
which, with a similar calculation to the above, can be shown to be bounded by
Finally, V de A ≤ f 1 (n, k 1 ) · f 2 (n, k 2 ), and
2(k1+k2) · 1 + (k 1 + 1) k1+1 · 1 + 2 · (k 2 + 1) k2+1 · |Σ|. ⊓ ⊔
